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Watergate and Vietnam: The Cold War 
Origins of a 
Constitutional Crisis 
Stephen M. Griffin* 
Watergate is usually thought of as the scandal and constitutional crisis 
which followed the June 1972 burglary of the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. by 
persons associated with President Nixon’s reelection committee and the 
subsequent cover-up, led by Nixon himself, of White House involvement in 
the burglary. 
As such, it is regarded as a domestic crisis centrally involving 
President Nixon’s efforts to undermine his political opponents.1  Legal 
scholars at least are not familiar with the substantial evidence showing that 
the origin of much (though certainly not all) of what we call “Watergate” 
lies in the foreign policy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.2  It has 
long been appreciated by historians of the Vietnam War that there was a 
meaningful link between Watergate and the domestic intelligence 
operations used to counter the war’s critics.3  In this respect, there is a case 
to be made that this symposium should have been held in 2011, the fortieth 
anniversary of the White House-ordered break-in to the office of Daniel 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in Los Angeles. 
In this essay, I situate Watergate within the context of the Cold War 
and the Vietnam War in particular.  This perspective might be called 
 
 * Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School.  Copyright by 
Harvard University Press.  All rights reserved.  I thank the participants at the conference for their 
comments.  This essay is drawn from a larger project on war powers.  The project is based on an 
extensive review of diplomatic history and is tentatively titled Long Wars and the Constitution: 
Presidents and the Constitutional Order From Truman to Obama (Harvard University Press, 
forthcoming 2013). 
 1 See, e.g., WILLIAM BUNDY, A TANGLED WEB: THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 
NIXON PRESIDENCY 470 (1998); JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 371 (2009). 
 2 BUNDY, supra note 1, at 472. 
 3 See GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 
1950–1975, at 299–300 (4th ed. 2002); ROBERT MANN, A GRAND DELUSION: AMERICA’S DESCENT 
INTO VIETNAM 687 (2001); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS: 1945–1990, at 238, 260–61 
(1991). 
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“Watergate as foreign policy.”  Certainly Nixon’s misdeeds ran in many 
directions besides those connected with the June 1972 burglary.4  To see 
Watergate afresh and understand how it makes sense as a crisis of what I 
call the “Cold War constitutional order” requires some rearranging of 
standard understandings. 
The premises of the Cold War order, generally supported by the 
public, required presidents to have the ability to respond if necessary with 
the full panoply of military force to the challenge of communist 
expansion.5  President Johnson was simply the latest heir to this legacy.6  
When the Vietnam War did not go as expected, the presidency became a 
cockpit of tension and frustration.7  The strains of war led Johnson and his 
successor Richard Nixon to a fixated concern with internal security.  They 
turned the capacities of the intelligence agencies, built-up during the Cold 
War, inward against American citizens.8  This was one of the key causes of 
Watergate.9 
This essay elaborates on this foreign policy explanation of Watergate 
in three parts.  In Part I, the scene is set by showing how an increased 
concern with internal security by both the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations flowed from the Vietnam War.  Part II concentrates on the 
Nixon administration and sets Watergate within the context of Nixon’s 
foreign policy and the Cold War more generally.  Part III explains why 
Watergate was a genuine constitutional crisis and how it, somewhat 
ironically, came to interfere with Nixon’s conduct of foreign policy. 
I.  FROM JOHNSON TO NIXON: VIETNAM AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
War imposes unique psychological stress on the inhabitant of the Oval 
Office.  The risks attendant to war and the personal responsibility that any 
President would feel for the men and women under his command tend to 
occupy the mind and crowd out everything else.  Because LBJ and his top 
advisers made the decision for war without any meaningful participation by 
 
 4 For useful accounts of the events surrounding the Watergate scandal, see generally FRED 
EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 
(1995); KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE 
WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990) [hereinafter KUTLER, 
WATERGATE]; STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES (1997) [hereinafter 
KUTLER, ABUSE]; J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS (1988); 
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY: HOW WE REMEMBER, FORGET, AND 
RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (1992). 
 5 See Stephen M. Griffin, Reconceiving the War Powers Debate 39–40 (Tulane Univ. School of 
Law, Working Paper No. 11-06), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652. 
 6 ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES, 1961–1973, at 105–06 
(1998) [hereinafter DALLEK, JOHNSON]. 
 7 Id. at 155–56. 
 8 EMERY, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 9 See id. 
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Congress, the stress was all the greater.10  Consider that fewer than six 
months after his muted July 1965 announcement that he was escalating the 
war, LBJ and his administration were under extraordinary strain.11  Even in 
the fall of 1965, the administration could sense that the public was not 
strongly behind the war.12  While this may have troubled them, it would not 
matter if their expectations of quickly forcing North Vietnam to negotiate 
had worked as planned.13  When this did not occur by the end of the year, 
the administration plunged into a series of recriminations and a fruitless 
debate about a bombing halt.14 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the decision for war had narrowed the range 
of options available to the President.  Once LBJ chose bombing as the 
method to force North Vietnam to negotiate, bombing had to work.15  This 
had the further effect of making administration policy hostage to the 
responses of the governments in both South and North Vietnam.16  LBJ 
could sense that now he had to win or his presidency would be forever 
discredited.17  A war fever took hold in the executive branch, creating a 
vicious circle, which undermined effective policymaking as officials saw 
that the President wanted only good news and interpreted new 
developments in their most favorable light.18  It did not help that they were 
susceptible to the same distortions in viewpoint that afflicted the President; 
they also knew that their personal credibility was on the line.19 
Under the strains of war, the Johnson administration’s attitude toward 
critics took a hard set.  By early 1966, LBJ thought that Senate critics such 
as J. William Fulbright were actually under communist influence.20  The 
ideological domestic downside of the Cold War associated with 
McCarthyism had returned with a vengeance.  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover encouraged LBJ in his belief 
that critics of the war were subversives and operated from the worst 
motives.21  All of the major intelligence agencies—the FBI, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), as well as 
the Army—developed covert domestic intelligence programs aimed at 
 
 10 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 155–56, 283. 
 11 Id. at 344–45. 
 12 Id. at 290–91. 
 13 See id. at 284–85. 
 14 See id. at 345–46. 
 15 See id. at 343. 
 16 See id. at 240–41.  
 17 See FREDRIK LOGEVALL, CHOOSING WAR: THE LOST CHANCE FOR PEACE AND THE 
ESCALATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM 369–70 (1999). 
 18 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 103, 356–57, 377–78, 388, 470–71; LOGEVALL, supra 
note 17, at 370–72.  See also DAVID KAISER, AMERICAN TRAGEDY: KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 460–61 (2000). 
 19 See DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 470; KAISER, supra note 18, at 462; LOGEVALL, supra 
note 17, at 389. 
 20 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 352. 
 21 Id. at 367. 
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monitoring and disrupting opposition to the war.22  Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon both believed that the antiwar movement was inspired by agents of 
international communism.23  When careful investigation by the intelligence 
agencies showed this to be false, they in effect ordered the agencies to 
prove the relationship.24 
How did the strains of war and internal security affect Nixon?25  When 
he took office, there were still well over 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam 
with combat action continuing at a high tempo.26  Nixon rejected the option 
of a quick withdrawal in favor of a strategy that had several elements in 
pursuit of his overall goal of “peace with honor”—a negotiated settlement 
in which the North Vietnamese would somehow be persuaded to withdraw 
their forces and guarantee the viability of the South Vietnamese 
government.27  Roughly, Nixon’s policy with respect to Vietnam was to 
satisfy domestic pressure for an end to the war by withdrawing U.S. forces, 
but slowly enough to preserve meaningful military options.28  To 
compensate for the withdrawal, the U.S. would build up South Vietnam’s 
ability to resist, a process of “Vietnamization,” which had begun under 
Johnson.29  More ambitiously, Nixon wanted to reframe the war against a 
new global strategy of détente with the Soviet Union and opening relations 
with China.  He felt sure that these leading communist states could bring 
pressure to bear on North Vietnam.30 
Sooner than Nixon anticipated, his Vietnam strategy involved him in 
new military responses, as North Vietnam continued to exert significant 
pressure—especially by using its sanctuaries in Cambodia, which was 
nonetheless a neutral country.31  At the same time, the reaction of the 
antiwar movement and the public generally was always a concern.32  So 
 
 22 Id. at 486–87. 
 23 Id. at 489 (discussing   Johnson’s   beliefs);;   MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD 
NIXON 70  (1999)  (discussing  Nixon’s  beliefs). 
 24 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 489; SMALL, supra  note 23, at 70. 
 25 For  histories  of  Nixon’s  administration  and  foreign  policy,  see generally BUNDY, supra note 2; 
ROBERT DALLEK, NIXON AND KISSINGER: PARTNERS IN POWER (2007) [hereinafter DALLEK, NIXON]; 
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, DÉTENTE AND CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM 
NIXON TO REAGAN (rev. ed. 1994); DAVID GREENBERG, NIXON’S SHADOW: THE HISTORY OF AN 
IMAGE (2003); JEFFREY KIMBALL, NIXON’S VIETNAM WAR (1998); RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: 
THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA (2008); SMALL, supra note 23. For 
useful memoirs and biographies, see generally WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); 
RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON (1978). 
 26 Henry Kissinger, Vietnam’s   Lessons,   L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2007, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-kissinger31may31,0,3265672.story. 
 27 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 72–73. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 73; see Military: 1969 – Vietnamization, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (May 7, 2011, 2:05 
PM), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam2-vietnamization.htm. 
 30 Don Keko, Nixon and Détente, EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 12, 2001), 
http://www.examiner.com/american-history-in-national/nixon-and-detente 
 31 President Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia, 
MEKONG.NET, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/nixon430.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
 32 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 166. 
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when Nixon decided to bomb Cambodia early in 1969, his first year in 
office, he determined it would have to be conducted in secret, something 
difficult to do with a major military operation.33  When news of the 
operation leaked, Nixon was upset and ordered FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover to wiretap the phones of administration aides and journalists.34 
Major antiwar protests were scheduled for the fall of 1969. At roughly 
the same moment, Nixon was considering “Duck Hook,” a major strike to 
force North Vietnam to settle the war on U.S. terms.35  Nixon knew that 
this expansion would require unusual “mental resolve” and a “go-for-broke 
public relations campaign, in which he would have to expend most or all of 
his political capital to survive ‘the heat.’”36  Duck Hook was dropped, but 
the idea of the decisive intervention remained.37  Nixon appreciated by the 
end of 1969 that the war was now his responsibility in full.38  Taking 
control of the war amid hostile domestic opposition would mean going on 
the offensive both abroad and at home.39  In April 1970, Nixon ordered 
U.S. troops to invade border regions in Cambodia to eliminate the North 
Vietnamese sanctuaries.40  It was characteristic of Nixon’s Vietnam 
strategy that all of these deliberations occurred in secret; thus Nixon shared 
his plans with very few people other than Henry Kissinger, his National 
Security Advisor.41  This occasioned intense stress, as Nixon considered it 
an operation he knew would be perceived as expanding the war.42 
Nixon did not foresee how much crisis management the Cambodian 
invasion would impose on his administration.  Universities all over the U.S. 
demonstrated in protest and several of Kissinger’s aides resigned.43  Under 
considerable pressure, Nixon began to act erratically.44  In the period 
leading up to the invasion, he seemed hyperactive to his subordinates, 
indulging in an “aggressive mania” as he attempted to steel himself for 
ordering a major military operation without congressional or public 
support.45  The invasion of Cambodia was perceived, not without cause, as 
a major expansion of the war by members of Congress and the antiwar 
movement.46  The unprecedented backlash and public protest that was the 
 
 33 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 118; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 131. 
 34 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 136. 
 35 Id. at 159. 
 36 Id. at 160. 
 37 Id. at 170–71. 
 38 Id. at 169–70. 
 39 Id. at 170. 
 40 Context  of  ‘April  24–30, 1970: Nixon Orders Invasion of Cambodia; Kissinger Staffers Resign 
Rather   than   Participate   in   Coordination’, HISTORY COMMONS, 
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a04242670parrotsbeak&scale=2#a04242670parrotsb
eak (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
 41 Id. 
 42 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 196–97. 
 43 Id. at 213. 
 44 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 198–200, 205; ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 260–62. 
 45 See KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 204. 
 46 See id. at 221. 
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result of the Cambodian invasion was the turning point that gave significant 
credibility and impetus to efforts already underway to curb the war-making 
power of the executive branch.47 
It was at this moment, amid the superheated atmosphere produced by 
the Cambodian invasion, when Nixon summoned the chiefs of the major 
intelligence agencies to chastise them for not cooperating more effectively 
against the nation’s domestic enemies.48  It would have been appropriate for 
Nixon to raise this issue with respect to foreign enemies, as the lack of 
cooperation between Hoover’s FBI and the CIA had been causing trouble 
for many years.49  But like Johnson, Nixon was convinced that the antiwar 
movement was inspired and led by communist agents.50  Not only was this 
false, a fact that the intelligence agencies had already confirmed, but it also 
illustrated the Nixon administration’s isolation from reasonable voices 
within the antiwar movement with which it could have had a meaningful 
dialogue about how to wind down the Vietnam War.51  Nixon, however, 
had worked himself into such a temper that he saw antiwar protesters on 
campuses as terrorists threatening the state itself.52  As summarized by 
historian Jeffrey Kimball, “[t]he Vietnam War heightened Nixon’s sense of 
world crisis, contributed to his emotional tension, compounded his 
personality disorders, and influenced his stratagems and tactics for dealing 
with home-front and foreign issues.”53 
The solution to the lack of cooperation among the intelligence 
agencies was later known as the Huston Plan, after the White House aide 
who wrote it at Nixon’s direction.54  The plan called for the centralization 
of domestic intelligence activities in the White House and involved 
aggressive, illegal measures such as break-ins to combat domestic protest.55  
When FBI Director Hoover objected, fearing disclosure of illegal activities, 
the plan was formally abandoned.56  Informally, however, these options 
continued to percolate at the White House.57  If the intelligence agencies 
would not take suitable action on their own, the White House itself would 
go operational and conduct break-ins and wiretaps in pursuit of information 
that would discredit its political enemies.58  This effort was a principal 
origin of what came to be known as Watergate.59 
 
 47 Id. at 220–21. 
 48 KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 98–99. 
 49 SMALL, supra note 23, at 56. 
 50 Tom Wells, Running Battle: Washington’s   War   at   Home, in LONG TIME GONE: SIXTIES 
AMERICA THEN AND NOW 75, 89 (Alexander Bloom ed., 2001). 
 51 SMALL, supra note 23, at 70. 
 52 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 208; GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 82. 
 53 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 225. 
 54 See KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 96–101 (detailing the Huston Plan). 
 55 LUKAS, supra note 4, at 33. 
 56 Id. at 32–34. 
 57 Id. at 35–37. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See generally PERLSTEIN, supra note 25. 
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II.  NIXON, THE COLD WAR, AND WATERGATE 
To understand Nixon’s presidency in the context of the Cold War, we 
should keep in mind that Nixon always intended to be a foreign affairs 
President.  He wanted to be remembered in history as someone who 
brought peace to the United States and the world.60  Nixon retained beliefs 
with respect to foreign policy that he had formed as Senator, and as Vice-
President in the Eisenhower administration.61  He accepted the verities of 
the Cold War and saw the conflict between the United States and 
communist countries as central.62  At the same time, he perceived strategic 
opportunities arising from the relatively new conflict between the Soviet 
Union and China.63  Nixon saw Vietnam in this context.  It was a war he 
had to settle, but on a global basis with terms favorable to the U.S.64 
It was crucial to Nixon’s conception of his presidency that he wanted 
to carry out this far-reaching strategy entirely in secret in order to announce 
it at the right moment to secure his place as one of the greatest presidents in 
history, confound his political opponents, and achieve reelection.65  This 
meant that during his administration an enormous amount of diplomatic 
and military activity occurred off the bureaucratic books.66  This did not 
bother Nixon, as he entered office with grievances against a number of 
government agencies centrally important to foreign policy, such as the 
State Department and the CIA, which he felt had mistreated him as Vice-
President.67  Partly for this reason, he resolved to be his own Secretary of 
State and he and Kissinger centralized control of foreign affairs and 
national security policy in the White House.68  The State and Defense 
Departments, as well as the CIA, were often cut out of both formulating 
and implementing policy.69  The White House and especially the national 
security staff thus went “operational” in foreign affairs from the beginning 
of Nixon’s presidency. 
This organizational setup assisted Nixon in making swift, decisive 
moves to advance U.S. interests.  With respect to intelligence policy, for 
example, John Ranelagh makes the valuable point that although the CIA 
had become something of a status quo agency by the late 1960s, Nixon did 
 
 60 GARTHOFF, supra note 25, at 30; SMALL, supra note 23, at 60–62. 
 61 See America and the Cold War: The Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Years, ACADEMIC 
AMERICAN, http://www.academicamerican.com/postww2/coldwar.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2012) 
(describing the views on foreign policy which were dominant while Nixon was Vice-President). 
 62 JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 546 (1987); ROBERT D. 
SCHULZINGER, A TIME FOR WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1941–1975, at 332 (1997). 
 63 SMALL, supra note 23, at 64–65; Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-soviet.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 64 See SMALL, supra note 23, at 65. 
 65 Cf. id at 61–62. 
 66 See id. at 54. 
 67 Id. at 55; DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84. 
 68 See DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84–85; SMALL, supra note 28, at 51–52. 
 69 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84–85; SMALL, supra note 23, at 51–52; RANELAGH, supra 
note 62, at 499–501, 538–39, 540–41. 
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not want to be a status quo President.70  He wanted aggressive action to 
create a more favorable balance of power.71  Historian Kimball has argued 
persuasively that Nixon’s “madman theory” of exercising power in 
unpredictable ways was related to the Eisenhower administration’s 
“massive retaliation” policy.72  While Nixon saw himself as an American 
Charles de Gaulle, a world leader in the grand European manner, his chief 
diplomat Kissinger thought the primary objective of the government was 
order.73  Neither Nixon nor Kissinger believed in democratic governance in 
foreign affairs in the sense of building support for their policy in Congress 
and the Senate.74 
Any breach in the wall of secrecy around the White House, and thus 
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts was therefore a mortal threat.75  
It was all the worse if the breach could be traced to someone who was part 
of the antiwar movement, a movement which to them was inspired by 
foreign communists and led by revolutionary terrorists.76  Thus the 
administration had a severe reaction in June 1971 to Daniel Ellsberg’s 
leaking of the Pentagon Papers to major newspapers including the New 
York Times.77  The Papers were a secret Department of Defense history of 
the Vietnam War ordered by Robert McNamara during the Johnson 
administration.78  Nixon commanded his aides to destroy Ellsberg’s 
credibility and, by extension, the credibility of the antiwar movement in the 
eyes of the public.79  Unbelievably, Nixon and his aides planned to dig up 
information on both Ellsberg and the Johnson administration by 
committing illegal break-ins.80 
Nixon’s remarks on the Pentagon Papers and Ellsberg, recorded by his 
taping system in the White House, leave an indelible and disturbing 
impression.  Nixon believed the young lawyers on his team did not have 
the proper attitude: 
These kids don’t understand.  They have no understanding of politics.  They have 
no understanding of public relations.  John Mitchell is that way.  John is always 
worried about is it technically correct?  Do you think, for Christ sakes, that the 
New York Times is worried about all the legal niceties?  Those sons of bitches are 
 
 70 See RANELAGH, supra note 62, at 546. 
 71 Id. at 546, 552; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 33. 
 72 See KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 76–77; Francis A Boyle, The Relevance of International Law 
to  the  ‘Paradox’  of  Nuclear  Deterrence, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1407, 1413 (1986). 
 73 BUNDY, supra note 1, at 517; ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 45; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 2, 
148; SMALL, supra note 23, at 61–62. 
 74 ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 206–07, 327, 486–87; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 189; SMALL, 
supra note 23, at 61–62, 242. 
 75 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 208. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–37; KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 110. 
 78 Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties 
and the Rule of Law, 1 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1981). 
 79 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–37. 
 80 Id. 
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killing me.  I mean, thank God, I leaked to the press [during the Hiss 
controversy].  This is what we’ve got to get—I want you to shake these 
(unintelligible) up around here.  Now you do it.  Shake them up.  Get them off 
their Goddamn dead asses and say now that isn’t what you should be talking 
about.  We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy.  They’re using any means.  We 
are going to use any means.  Is that clear?81 
Nixon went on to refer to a scheme to burglarize the Brookings 
Institution, a Washington think tank, to retrieve classified documents on 
Vietnam he believed might be in its possession.82  He continued, “Did they 
get the Brookings Institute raided last night?  No.  Get it done.  I want it 
done.  I want the Brookings Institute’s safe cleaned out and have it cleaned 
out in a way that it makes somebody else [responsible?].”83 
The Special Investigative Unit (commonly known as “the Plumbers”), 
a team set up in the White House to combat leaks, was available to conduct 
the projected break-ins.84  One was carried out in September 1971—a 
burglary of the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in Los Angeles.85  Once this 
occurred, Nixon and his men were ensnared in a criminal conspiracy.86  
Everyone involved in the operation knew something that could be of mortal 
danger to Nixon and his top aides in the White House.87  Historians have 
argued that when the burglary at the Watergate complex was discovered in 
June 1972, Nixon had to lead a cover-up of this operation to ensure that the 
links between the Ellsberg and Watergate burglaries would not be 
discovered.88 
These operations were carried out in the main by E. Howard Hunt, 
who had recently retired from the CIA.89  Hunt had participated in various 
CIA operations, including the Bay of Pigs.90  Nixon and his aides believed 
that Hunt could be relied on to carry out the kind of operations originally 
anticipated in the Huston plan.91  When Hunt needed men to help him, he 
turned to Cubans who had been trained by the CIA to commit acts of 
sabotage against Castro.92  Many of these same people were involved in the 
1972 break-in at the Watergate complex along with James McCord, a 
former chief of security at the CIA.93 
 
 81 Id. at 8. John Mitchell was the Attorney General. John Newton Mitchell, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=66 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). 
 82 See  KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 8. 
 83 Id. 
 84 KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 111–12; KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 28. 
 85 KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 28. 
 86 See NIXON, supra note 25, at 841–42. 
 87 SMALL, supra note 23, at 238, 276. 
 88 See e.g., SMALL, supra note 23, at 238, 276. For  Nixon’s  remarks  in  his  memoirs  see  NIXON, 
supra note 25, at 841–42. 
 89 RANELAGH, supra note 62, at 521. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–6, 27–28. 
 92 LUKAS, supra note 4, at 94–97. 
 93 SMALL, supra note 23, at 255. 
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After the Watergate burglars were arrested, the leading idea among 
Nixon’s men was to quash the FBI investigation by claiming that 
Watergate was a CIA operation having to do with the Bay of Pigs.94  Nixon 
was later convicted in the court of public opinion by the disclosure of a 
June 23, 1972 tape in which Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R. 
Haldeman, to order the CIA to carry out this plan.95  CIA Director Richard 
Helms and his deputy Vernon Walters were confident that Watergate had 
nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs and resisted White House overtures to 
assist with the cover-up.96 
Ironically, there was an important sense in which Watergate did relate 
to the Bay of Pigs.  The various break-ins were carefully planned, requiring 
training, discipline, and knowledge of specialized equipment.97  The men 
carrying them out could not be ordinary criminals—that would leave the 
administration too vulnerable to involvement with unpredictable characters.  
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations invested significant resources in 
training a covert army of operatives against Castro.98  After the Bay of Pigs 
invasion failed in 1961, these operatives were based in the Miami area.99  
In this respect, the Cold War efforts against Castro, particularly in the 
Kennedy administration, became braided together with Nixon’s efforts to 
destroy domestic opposition to his war policies in a very dangerous way.  It 
is likely that the break-ins could not have occurred as they did had these 
operatives, accustomed to living above the law, not been available to the 
administration.100  The Cuban operatives were hard-line anticommunists 
who perhaps believed they were acting to protect the United States against 
the communist-inspired antiwar movement.101 
Nevertheless, once they were caught, the imperatives of a criminal 
conspiracy took over.102  This put the President of the United States in the 
incredible position of being vulnerable to blackmail by the Watergate 
burglars.103  The country was fortunate that Hunt and his fellow 
conspirators simply wanted Nixon to give them money to pay for their 
defense and expenses.104  Suppose they had wanted changes in government 
policy?  This dire possibility was a logical consequence of the President 
becoming involved in a conspiracy to break the law. 
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If Watergate had simply been a matter of the June 1972 burglary and 
the subsequent rather improvised cover-up, it might be appropriate to view 
it as an external hindrance to the administration’s foreign policy 
initiatives.105  But Watergate was inextricably connected with the foreign 
policy of the Nixon administration and thus with the Cold War itself.106  
The maintenance of the Cold War, and any conventional war such as 
Vietnam, required an enormous effort on the part of the government to 
maintain morale on the domestic front.107  President Truman had the public 
behind him when he went to war in Korea in June 1950, despite the lack of 
congressional authorization, given that the preceding three years had seen a 
rising public concern over the communist challenge.108  Nixon’s task of 
garnering public support for military actions in Vietnam was far more 
difficult, and thus suggested the waning of the Cold War.  He knew the 
Vietnam War was unpopular and that the end would at least have to be in 
sight by the time he ran for reelection.109  He decided to combat the antiwar 
movement with all the means available to him, including intelligence 
capabilities built since the 1950s.110  This pushed the entire political system 
into a constitutional crisis.111 
III.  WATERGATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
Watergate has been regarded as a paradigm case of a constitutional 
crisis, not simply in the heat of the moment, but in the sober reflection of 
history.112  However, a few knowledgeable and historically-minded 
scholars have surprisingly claimed that it was not.113  The problem with 
these accounts may be an overemphasis on the fact that the Watergate crisis 
ended in Nixon’s prospective impeachment and resignation, procedures 
allowed by the Constitution, rather than with riots and troops in the 
streets.114  Although we can be thankful that Nixon did not attempt to retain 
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his office by force, the inescapable constitutional aspect of Watergate was 
how all of the circumstances I have highlighted flowed from Nixon’s abuse 
of his office, an office whose powers had been greatly altered by the post-
1945 constitutional order.  Nixon’s extreme abuse of his powers was not 
the only reason Watergate was a constitutional crisis; the consequences of 
Watergate also mattered.  One consequence was that it rendered Nixon 
ineffective as President, especially with respect to foreign policy.115 
By the time of Nixon’s inauguration for his second term in January 
1973, the Watergate cover-up was in a deep predicament.116  The blackmail 
demands of the burglars were escalating and various parties in the White 
House saw themselves as under threat of being implicated in the cover-
up.117  As a result, Nixon would be effective as President for only three 
more months.  At the beginning of the pivotal month of April 1973, 
Nixon’s popularity and standing with the public were still intact.118  But 
Nixon had conceded to his chief of staff H. R. Haldeman that governance 
would become impossible if public pressure increased.119  By the end of the 
month, a mounting series of disclosures had forced him to dismiss 
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, his two most essential aides.120 
After the dismissal of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon sank into a 
depression and for some periods could not function as President.121  During 
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Nixon was incapacitated by the sudden 
crisis, which followed from his dismissal of special prosecutor Archibald 
Cox, and was unable to make crucial foreign policy decisions.122  Another 
special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was appointed, and Nixon’s time in 
office (until his resignation in August 1974) was consumed by 
Watergate.123  He could not take meaningful action, for example, in 
addressing the serious energy crisis in the winter of 1973, which was the 
consequence of the war in the Middle East.124 
Watergate was also a constitutional crisis because in some sense, 
Nixon willed it to be.  Arguably like other conservatives during the 1970s, 
he sensed the high degree of entrenchment liberals had achieved in 
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institutions both inside and outside the government.125  It is likely he was 
weary of struggling with a persisting Democratic Congress and the interest 
groups that supported the Democratic Party.  After the 1972 election in 
particular, he was obsessed with seeking revenge on the many people and 
groups whom he believed had wronged him.126  As he recounted in his 
memoirs: “In this second term I had thrown down a gauntlet to Congress, 
the bureaucracy, the media, and the Washington establishment and 
challenged them to engage in epic battle.”127  Another self-willed moment 
of crisis occurred when Nixon fired special prosecutor Cox and earned the 
whirlwind of an impeachment inquiry.128  The significant point is that 
Nixon deliberately generated crises as a way of coping with the unwelcome 
reality that there were effective limits on his ability to reorder the policy 
universe.  He certainly had no scruples about challenging any checks and 
balances the original Constitution put in his way.  This was the most 
fundamental reason why “Watergate”—Nixon’s way of managing the 
burdens of the Cold War—was a constitutional crisis, but one intimately 
linked to the pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Watergate can be usefully understood as part of an immense drama in 
which the constitutional order with respect to foreign policy and war 
powers founded after 1945 became increasingly unstable.  The appalling 
costs of the Vietnam War and the crash of Nixon’s presidency showed the 
jerry-built and provisional character of the Cold War constitutional order.  
The qualitative difference that war makes to government reasserted itself 
with a vengeance and showed that the kind of deliberation allowed by the 
post-1945 order was shockingly inadequate.  The premises of the Cold War 
order would never again be sufficient by themselves to compel the nation 
to engage in conventional war.  A further consequence was the crippling 
legacy of the loss of trust in government.  While Vietnam and Watergate 
were not the only causes of the decline of trust in government in the 1960s 
and 1970s, they were significant contributors to a decline that was 
permanent in the sense that it has never been restored to the level prevailing 
before the war.129  In this respect, we are still dealing with the 
consequences of Vietnam and Watergate. 
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